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Abstract The development of students’ mathematical reasoning (MR) is a goal of several curricula 
and an essential element of the culture of the mathematics education research community. But what 
mathematical reasoning consists of is not always clear; it is generally assumed that everyone has a 
sense of what it is. Wanting to clarify the elements of MR, this research project aimed to qualify it 
from a theoretical perspective, with an elaboration that would not only indicate its ways of being 
thought about and espoused but also serve as a tool for reflection and thereby contribute to the further 
evolution of the cultures of the teaching and research communities in mathematics education. To 
achieve such an elaboration, a literature search based on anasynthesis (Legendre, 2005) was 
undertaken. From the analysis of the mathematics education research literature on MR and taking a 
commognitive perspective (Sfard, 2008), the synthesis that was carried out led to conceptualizing a 
model of mathematical reasoning. This model, which is herein described, is constituted of two main 
aspects: a structural aspect and a process aspect, both of which are needed to capture the central 
characteristics of MR. 
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1 Introduction: The conceptual blur regarding mathematical reasoning 
 
What is mathematical reasoning? How might we characterize it? These questions underpinned the 
development of the model of mathematical reasoning (MR) (Jeannotte, 2015) that is the focus of this 
article. While curricular documents around the world emphasize the fostering of students’ MR as an 																																																								1	Corresponding author:	Doris Jeannotte;  jeannotte.doris@uqam.ca 
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important goal (e.g., NCTM, 2000; OCDE, 2006), the way in which MR is described within these 
documents tends to be vague, unsystematic, and even contradictory from one document to the other. 
As well, within the mathematics education research community, the discourse on MR is not 
monolithic; it does not consist of a single voice. Various visions of mathematics, and of teaching and 
learning, confront each other. An additional factor adds to the confusion, as pointed out by Yackel and 
Hanna (2003): “Writing about reasoning in mathematics is complicated by the fact that the term 
reasoning, like understanding, is widely used with the implicit assumption that there is universal 
agreement on its meaning” (p. 228). But, as an in-depth search of the research literature makes amply 
clear, this assumption does not hold.  
At the extreme end of the spectrum is that “most mathematicians and mathematics educators 
use this term [mathematical reasoning] without any clarification or elaboration” (Yackel & Hanna, 
2003, p. 228). Nevertheless, among those who do define MR, various aspects are stressed by various 
authors. Arsac (1996) and Cabassut (2005) emphasize its double nature (product vs. process); Arsac 
(1996) and Lithner (2008), its function of producing new knowledge; and Duval (1995), its function of 
changing the epistemic3 value of a certain proposition. Definitions of the classic forms of MR, such as 
deductive, inductive, and abductive, are all to be found but with various emphases. Duval (1995) 
insists that only deductive reasoning can be considered mathematical, while Reid (2003), Rivera 
(2008), and Meyer (2010) point to the importance of abductive reasoning in mathematical discovery. 
In contrast to the structural aspect related to the form of MR, the literature also discloses 
characterizations of MR that stress its underlying processes, with inferencing being at the heart of 
these processes: conjecturing (Mason, 1982; Stylianides, 2008), generalizing (Stylianides, 2008), 
exemplifying (Mason, 1982), proving (Duval, 1995; Stylianides, 2008), arguing (Pedemonte, 2002), 
and convincing (Cabassut, 2005). While the process aspect is well represented in the literature, it 
remains relatively unexplored from an epistemological perspective.  
These few highlights from the research literature on MR suggest that this area is one that could 
benefit greatly from an attempt at coherent conceptualization. What Steen said in 1999 is still true 
today: MR sometimes “denotes the distinctively mathematical methodology of axiomatic reasoning, 
logical deduction, and formal inference. Other times it signals a much broader quantitative and 
geometric craft that blends analysis and intuition with reasoning and inference, both rigorous and 																																																								
3 The epistemic value of a proposition refers to the notion that an utterance can be true, probable, likely, or false. 
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suggestive. This ambiguity confounds any analysis and leaves room for many questions” (Steen, 1999, 
p. 270). The current state of the field renders difficult any comparison of not only the various 
approaches to, and characterizations of, MR but also the results of related studies. The importance of 
developing MR in the teaching and learning of mathematics at the different levels of schooling, as well 
as the need for substantive conceptual resources on MR in the training and professional development 
of teachers, also serve to motivate a deeper and more theoretically-sound study of MR.  
 Thus, the objective of this research is to elaborate a conceptual model of mathematical reasoning 
for the teaching and learning of primary and secondary levels of school mathematics (see also 
Jeannotte, 2015). The article “a” is here very important since it implies that it is A model among other 
possibilities, in line with Sfard’s (2012) principle of multivocality. As will be stated in the next 
section, our epistemological stance, which is central to the whole process, goes hand-in-hand with the 
adopted theoretical frame, which in turn plays the role of an interpretative lens for drawing out key 
features of MR from the research literature. Following the presentation of the theoretical framework, 
we describe the anasynthesis methodology (Legendre, 2005), which provided a rigorous tool for 
searching the mathematics education research literature. Then we present an overview of some of these 
key features of MR that were extracted from the literature, features that co-constituted the emerging 
conceptualization of a model of MR for school mathematics. It must be emphasized, however, that the 
result is not a unique model that unifies all of the divergences found in the literature. It is rather a 
model that systematizes the various converging features of MR within a theoretically coherent frame. 
As argued by Balacheff (2008, p. 501): “The scientific challenge of research in mathematics education 
is […] to shape a body of knowledge which should be robust (which means theoretically valid) and 
relevant (which means instrumental for practitioners and other stake holders). Convergence should be 
the rule.” 
 
2 Theoretical considerations 
 
2.1 Sociocultural assumptions of this research 
 
The sociocultural turn in mathematics education research (e.g., Cobb, 2007) has sensitized the 
community not only to the phenomenon of the co-constructive emergence of the classroom 
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mathematical culture by its participants – both teacher and learners – but also to the role played by the 
ways of reasoning and communicating that draw upon historical practices of the discipline. These 
ways of reasoning mathematically are correspondingly reflected in the didactic literature on MR in 
schools.  
Student discursive activity consisting of what students say, the way in which they say it, what 
they do, the representations and drawings they make, the ways in which they use these representations, 
and their intonations and gestures, all these are key levers in the activation of a teacher’s input with 
respect to enculturating students to the ways of participating and the ways of reasoning that are 
expected of them. To provide this input, teachers must not only be aware of the nature of the forms and 
processes of mathematical reasoning that they wish students to learn to participate in but also 
recognize when students are engaging in the desired aspects of reasoning. This requires a well-
elaborated vision of MR where discourse is fundamental and that not only reflects the didactical 
discourse of the discipline but also serves as a conceptual tool for teachers (and researchers) to analyze 
students’ discursive activity.  
 
2.2 The commognitive frame 
 
From this sociocultural view, MR can be seen as discursive activity. To conceptualize MR as 
discursive activity, we turn to the commognitive framework developed by Sfard (2008, 2012). Sfard 
(2008) defines commognition as “the term that encompasses thinking (individual cognition) and 
(interpersonal) communicating. As a combination of the words communication and cognition, it 
stresses the fact that these two processes are different (intrapersonal and interpersonal) manifestations 
of the same phenomenon” (p. 296). Within the commognitive framework, discourse is central. 
According to Sfard (2008), discourse is a “special type of communication made distinct by its 
repertoire of admissible actions […] and discourses in language are distinguishable by their 
vocabularies, visual mediators, routines, and endorsed narratives” (p. 297).  
For a commognitive researcher, mathematics is a discourse, that is, a particular type of 
communication (Sfard, 2008, 2012). Development of mathematical discourse (i.e., development of 
mathematics) involves a change in discourse, which occurs within the mathematical community in 
which we evolve. In a movement of individualization and (re)communication, changes in discourse are 
5		
proposed, rejected, and negotiated. For example, Sfard (2008) notes that algebra is a meta-discourse 
that subsumes arithmetical discourse and becomes a discourse in itself. From an epistemological 
vantage point, this position has implications for the way in which MR will be conceptualized: It is the 
given mathematics community in which we evolve that fixes the rules, the acceptable visual mediators, 
and word use.  
Another point is that within the commognitive approach, there are two main kinds of discursive 
development: object-level and meta-level. Object-level discourse development refers to an extension 
of an existing discourse on already constructed mathematical objects. On the other hand, meta-level 
discourse development refers to the construction of a new discourse, changing the rules of the game, 
which goes hand in hand with the building of new mathematical objects. As will be seen later, the 
distinction between the type of discourse and the type of discourse development will prove crucial in 
discriminating those mathematical thinking processes that will be considered processes of MR. 
The choice of Sfard’s (2008) commognitive frame as the main underpinning of this research 
project on the elaboration of a model of MR for school mathematics has certain implications and 
limits. The narrative form of the model is open to different interpretations, especially if approached 
from an incommensurable discourse. Furthermore, the aim here is not to construct a model that 
provides specific practical advice with respect to classroom task sequences that are designed to 
encourage the development of MR. Nor is the aim to construct a model that illustrates the research-
based ways in which students have been found to develop and communicate certain modes of MR. 
Rather the aim is to construct, in harmony with the commognitive frame, a coherent theoretical model 
that synthesizes and builds upon the convergences to be found in the main types and characteristics of 
MR described in the mathematics education research literature and that can thereby serve as a 
conceptual tool for both teachers and researchers, that is, a narrative model that connects semantically 
different concepts in the same coherent network – thus, a means to improve communication with the 
help of a shared vocabulary (Lee, 1997).  
The Oxford Living Dictionary (https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/narrative) defines 
narrative both as a spoken or written account of connected events and as a representation of a 
particular situation or process in such a way as to reflect or conform to an overarching set of aims or 
values. The connected events that are represented by the model – connected and interpreted by means 
of the discursive framework that underpins the model – are those aspects of mathematical reasoning 
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that have become a part of the current narratives in the mathematics education community. And 
because narratives invite interpretation, the model, which is itself a narrative, will evolve as others 
from other vantage points read it, and take it on and adapt it to their own practice. 
 
3 Methodology 
 
The commognitive stand taken here creates methodological implications. For a commognitive 
researcher, research development is equivalent to development of research discourse. A researcher has 
to build on other researchers’ works and attempt to develop a common discourse. This supports the 
justification that the data for this study are the mathematics education literature resources dealing with 
MR. Those data allow for constructing with and grounding upon the discourse already built by 
members of the mathematics education community. 
The methodological process that framed this research is anasynthesis (Legendre, 2005) – 
anasynthesis being a neologism coined from the words analysis and synthesis. We present this process 
linearly but readers should consider it a cyclical process (see Fig. 1).  
First, we created a corpus from a review of databases and selected texts that had MR as a 
keyword or associated keywords such as mathematical thinking, deductive reasoning, inductive 
reasoning, and so on. Additional cycles provided new keywords that helped to elaborate the corpus. 
Four criteria were used to select the corpus: access, completeness, recency, and authenticity (Van der 
Maren, 1996). We also added famous texts and those cited by authors who have studied MR but were 
not referenced in the database. To assure the quality of the sources, the Toerner and Arzarello (2012) 
classification was used to refine the selection of scientific journals. By the end of the process, 145 
English and French texts4 (books, chapters, articles, and research reports in proceedings) constituted 
the corpus.  
Secondly, at every cycle, we analyzed the resulting corpus for relevant information related to 
formal, axiological, and praxis characteristics of MR (Jeannotte, 2015). The formal characteristic 
refers to accuracy, description, expression, and definition of concepts, terms, notions; the axiological 
characteristic refers to aims, goals, principles; and the praxis characteristic refers to norms, 
prescriptions, theoretical or experimental practices, habits, and custom. Content and conceptual 																																																								
4 In French, the word raisonnement is usually translated as reasoning (see, e.g., Duval, 1991). 
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analyses supported the model building process. Successive and repeated readings allowed for locating 
the MR units that were to be categorized. Every unit received three codes: i) descriptors linked to the 
nature of the information (formal, axiological, or praxis); ii) descriptors linked to its content (e.g., 
deductive reasoning, abductive reasoning, inference, conjecturing, proving, …) – descriptors that 
helped to constitute the corpus; and iii) descriptors linked to the emergent characteristics of MR (e.g., 
structure, process) – this third level of codification going beyond the content and helping in the 
building of the model. For example, the unit “To reason is to infer a proposition, called conclusion, 
from certain premises” (Cabassut, 2005, p. 24, our translation) provided not only formal information, 
but was also linked to the keyword inference, and highlighted both the structural aspect (i.e., premises, 
proposition, and conclusion) and the process aspect (in defining reasoning by an action verb, i.e., 
inferring). The analysis was guided by commognitive principles (Sfard, 2012) that led to searching for 
discursive elements within the texts of the corpus, but that also took into account the context and 
epistemological positions behind the text.  
Thirdly, this information was then synthesized so as to highlight convergences, divergences, 
and to point out areas where there were theoretical gaps that would need to be filled in by any model 
proposing to represent the central aspects of MR for school mathematics. Via the commognitive 
framework that underpinned this research, a theoretical prototype was then developed, which became a 
self-standing, theoretically-coherent model of MR after multiple anasynthetic cycles (see Fig. 1). As 
the goal was to provide a portrait of the concept of MR, we stopped the process when no new 
information emerged and when the model respected internal coherence, relevance to the issue raised, 
and heuristic value (local validation). We emphasize that the coherence of the model is constituted by 
its commognitive, discursive framing that, in conjunction with the methodological procedures of 
anasynthesis, provided the theoretical tools to discern both the gaps and overlaps within the 
mathematics education research literature related to MR and thereupon to move forward in the creative 
act of conceptualizing the model.    
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Fig. 1 The methodological process of anasynthesis 
 
Each element that emerged was either explicitly or implicitly linked to MR by multiple texts. 
With the help of the commognitive frame, we reformulated them with a sound vocabulary reflecting a 
discursive approach to MR. From this perspective, the resulting theoretical model of MR is designed to 
enable a better and fuller understanding of MR in the context of school mathematics, as well as a tool 
for improved communication by providing a shared vocabulary. In addition, the model aims to nourish 
reflection on MR among researchers and teachers – those who can, by their action, influence directly 
or indirectly student learning. Discourse is what teachers rely on to judge whether MR is occurring in 
the class. Furthermore, as Lee (1997) has pointed out, “without a theoretical model, research remains 
piecemeal or eclectic and without empirical research the diverse models or theories stagnate” (p. 42). 
With this model, we respond to Reid’s (2002) appeal to the mathematics education research 
community: “The aim of developing mathematical reasoning in classrooms calls on the research 
community to clarify what is mathematical reasoning and what it looks like in school contexts”  (p. 7).  
 
4 Mathematical reasoning: What are its central aspects5 
 
Four major elements emerged from the analysis of the mathematics education literature, elements that 
helped to clarify the conceptual blur found therein: the activity/product dichotomy, the inferential 
nature of MR, the goal and functions of MR, and what we came to refer to as the structural and process 
aspects.  
																																																								5	Please note that, in the interests of space, only a small number of the references that were actually consulted and that 
served to help in the development of the model are included herein. 
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The activity/product dichotomy relates to reasoning activity that is considered inaccessible and 
for which the product is but an imperfect hint (e.g., Balacheff, 1988). The inferential nature of MR is 
emphasized by many authors who point to the novel ideas that result from such inferencing; however, 
the precise nature of this novelty has yet to be clarified. The element of the goal and functions of MR 
also leads to questions, such as whether the goal of MR is restricted to proving (e.g., deVilliers, 1999) 
or whether the function of all MR processes is to change the epistemic value of a narrative 
(e.g., Duval, 1995). Finally, MR is traditionally defined in terms of structure, that is, the form in which 
the reasoning is expressed, be it deductive, inductive, or abductive. On the other hand, the process 
perspective, which is espoused by others, tends not to be defined or explored epistemologically. 
The articulation of these four elements, combined within the commognitive perspective, leads 
to defining MR as a process of communication with others or with oneself that allows for inferring 
mathematical utterances from other mathematical utterances. So the second major element is captured 
in this definition, that is, the inferential nature of MR – the  element that will be seen to play a key role 
in both the structural and process aspects of MR. Also, we can say from the analysis of the literature 
that MR develops the discourse by extension (endogenous discursive expansion, in the terminology of 
Sfard, 2008), that is, there is no change in meta-discursive rules; there is no new mathematical object 
in a commognitive sense. The novelty is situated within the objet-level utterances themselves. This 
definition also allows us to avoid the first major element, that is, the activity/product dichotomy, in 
that discourse within our framework is seen as both activity and product. Every communicational act 
presents both the activity and product aspects, which are captured respectively by the process and 
structural aspects of MR.  
As will be seen, the dual aspects related to the structural and process element allow for refining 
our above definition and at the same time integrate the different functions (the third element) of MR. 
Thus, the structural and process element, in conjunction with key discursive features of the underlying 
commognitive framework, will be seen to capture all four elements of MR that emerged from the 
literature. These two aspects are elaborated in the next sections, with less space devoted to the 
structural because it has already been relatively well explored from an epistemological perspective in 
the mathematics education literature. It is important to emphasize, before continuing, that the structural 
and process aspects of MR represent two different ways of looking at a given discourse. Both aspects 
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are present and are related dialectically: structures are part of the process aspect of MR and processes 
contribute to the construction of those structures.  
  
4.1 Structural aspect of mathematical reasoning 
  
The structural aspect of MR refers in general to a more static aspect that is related to the form of a 
given piece of MR. More specifically, the structural aspect refers to the way in which the discursive 
elements combine in an ordered system that describes both the elements and their relation with each 
other. The more cited forms are deduction, induction, and abduction. Likewise, Toulmin (2007) and 
Peirce (n.d.) are the more widely used references for discussing the structural aspect within the 
literature. The Toulmin model schematizes the basic elements (data, claim, warrant) along with the 
qualifier (linked to the epistemic value), the backing (to further support the warrant), and the rebuttal 
(to pre-empt possible counter arguments to the claim). All those elements are narrative in nature and 
serve to structure the mathematical discourse. The Peirce model involves three basic, one-step, modes 
of inference: the deductive, the inductive, and the abductive. Every step is composed minimally of 
data, claim, and warrant (to use the same terminology across the two models). The deductive, the 
inductive, and the abductive each infer a different conclusion.  
 
4.1.1 Deductive step 
 
Deductive reasoning is, for some authors, synonymous with MR. Duval (1995), for example, describes 
deductive reasoning as the only form of reasoning that can change the epistemic value of mathematical 
knowledge from likely to true. As a structural aspect, the deductive step infers a claim from data and 
warrant. The nature of the qualifier attached to the claim (which is the conclusion for the deductive 
step) depends on the epistemic value of the data and the warrant. The deductive form of reasoning 
plays an important role within the processes of proving and formal proving, both of which require 
deductive restructuring (see Section 4.2.2).  
 
4.1.2 Inductive step 
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Inductive reasoning is the second most common step in the literature linked to MR. It is defined 
inconsistently, partly because it refers to every reasoning that is not deductive (Reid, 2010). In our 
model, the inductive step infers a warrant from the data and the claim about the data. The epistemic 
value (i.e., the qualifier) that is allowed with respect to the conclusion of the inductive step is that of 
likely (or probable). Inductive reasoning is linked to the soon-to-be-described process of generalizing 
(Pedemonte, 2002; Rivera, 2008) in that this process can, at one moment or another, be structured 
inductively. 
  
4.1.3 Abductive step 
 
Researchers interested in the study of exploration activity, such as Reid (2003) and Pedemonte (2002), 
introduce the abductive step. It is a less discussed structure that is sometimes mingled with the 
inductive step (Rivera, 2008). According to Eco (1983, in Pedemonte & Reid, 2011), the abductive 
step can take two forms. The first infers data from the claim and the warrant. The second infers data 
and warrant from the claim. For Peirce (n.d.), the abductive step infers elements that can explain the 
claim. The abductive reasoning structure can be an element of every MR process by generating data 
and warrant in the search for similarities and differences as in, for example, generalizing (Rivera, 
2008), conjecturing (Pedemonte, 2002), and also validating (Pedemonte & Reid, 2011).  
 
4.1.4 Concluding remarks on the structural aspect of mathematical reasoning 
 
From a commognitive standpoint, the structural aspect highlights the construction rules of 
mathematical discourse as well as its diverse components. It foregrounds the nature of the conclusion 
and its epistemic value. According to Peirce (n.d.), the validity of the reasoning is not judged only 
from its structure, but from the epistemic value attached to the conclusion, thus giving a special status 
to the deductive step. (This position stands in contrast to standard definitions of logical validity where 
an argument is valid if and only if it takes a form that makes it impossible for the premises to be true 
and the conclusion nevertheless to be false; it is not required that a valid argument have premises that 
are actually true.) The meta-rules that control mathematical discourse (within a mathematical 
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community) demand that the discourse of reasoning be eventually structured into the deductive step. It 
is the unique structure that allows for theorization of mathematical discourse.  
Even if necessary to a model of MR for the teaching and learning of school mathematics, the 
structural aspect is not sufficient for fully understanding the nature of MR in school. While it puts 
forward, in a static way, the narrative elements, relations, and epistemic values that constitute MR, it 
neglects the temporality and axiological nature of MR that are central to reasoning activity. The 
process aspect, less developed in the literature, will fill that gap. 
 
4.2 Process aspect of mathematical reasoning 
 
Several action verbs are linked to MR in the literature, verbs that put forward the temporal nature of 
MR. However, few texts conceptualize MR as a process. From the commognitive perspective adopted 
here, the following definition of the process aspect of MR emerges:  
 
MR processes are commognitive processes that are meta-discursive, that is, that derive narratives 
about objects or relations by exploring the relations between objects. 
 
Of the several overlapping MR processes found within the literature, nine distinct processes 
emerged. Eight of these were classified into one of two categories: the processes related to the search 
for similarities and differences, or the processes related to validating. These categories, which are 
similar to those described by Stylianides (2008), materialized after several feedback cycles. The ninth 
process, that of exemplifying, was classified as a support for both of the other two categories. The 
description of each of these nine processes follows. It includes: i) some background literature that gave 
rise to the inclusion of the given process; ii) the creation of a definition of the given process that is 
consistent with the commognitive framework; and iii) a brief discussion of the process from a 
commognitive point of view.  
 
4.2.1 Processes related to the search for similarities and differences 
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The following five processes relate to the search for similarities and differences: generalizing, 
conjecturing, identifying a pattern, comparing, and classifying.  
 
Generalizing  
For Stylianides (2008) and Artzt (1999), MR is all about generalizing and arriving at valid 
conclusions. According to Stylianides (2008), generalizing is “the transportation of mathematical 
relations from given sets to new sets for which the original sets are subsets” (p. 9). For Pedemonte 
(2002), the processes of argumentation that involve generalizing allow for passing to a larger set and 
also provide the reasons for believing in the narrative: “Mathematical argumentation always has the 
objective of seeking truth” (p. 30, our translation). However, it is the passage from a given set to a 
larger one that is highlighted by our anasynthesis (e.g., Dreyfus, 1991). The inferential and expansion 
aspects of generalizing are considered its main features, thereby leading to the following definition of 
generalizing:  
 
Generalizing: A process that infers narratives about a set of mathematical objects or a 
relation between objects of the set from a subset of this set.  
 
From a commognitive viewpoint, we can link generalizing to MR because the process is clearly 
associated with inference and discourse, without necessarily creating a new incommensurable 
discourse. In contrast, abstracting (Jeannotte, 2015) produces a meta-level development of discourse 
and is thereby not considered a process of MR from a commognitive perspective. 
 
Conjecturing 
According to Stylianides (2008), conjecturing has to lead to a reasoned conjecture. The conjecture, as a 
narrative, is then always associated with the epistemic value, probable or likely. Other MR processes 
are thus needed to determine whether the conjecture is true or false. For Stylianides, conjecturing also 
leads to an utterance that generalizes the cases generated, that is, that expands its domain of 
application. Mason (1982) describes conjecturing as a cyclical process involving i) enunciating clearly 
a conjecture, ii) verifying that the conjecture covers all known cases and examples, iii) being wary of 
the conjecture by trying to refute it, and iv) finding out why it is true or modifying it (which brings us 
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back to i). A related element pulled from the literature is the link between conjecture and theorem. 
Pedemonte (2002), who proposes a parallel between the two, states that argumentation is linked with 
conjecture and formal proving is linked with theorem. 
Thus, several elements are retained in order to build the definition of conjecturing as a MR 
process. First, a central element is the search for regularity, the search for some relation. In fact, it is 
the search for similarities and differences that emerges from the analysis. This search allows for 
building a relation – around objects or other relations, that is, around some mathematical phenomenon. 
Second, conjecturing leads to a narrative with probable or likely as its epistemic value. There is an 
uncertainty about the built narrative. Third, conjecturing can lead to a general discourse when it 
expands an observed relation to a larger set. What distinguishes conjecturing from generalizing is that 
it has an epistemic value attached to it. Conjecturing can thus be defined as follows:  
 
Conjecturing: A MR process that, by the search for similarities and differences, infers a 
narrative about some regularity with a likely or probable epistemic value and that has the 
potential for mathematical theorization.  
 
From a commognitive viewpoint, conjecturing leads to an extension of the discourse by the 
building of likely narratives, based on the search for similarities and differences.  
 
Identifying a pattern 
Is identifying a pattern different from the process of conjecturing? For example, is there a probable 
epistemic value attached to the identifying of a pattern? According to Stylianides (2008), identifying a 
pattern (i.e., a recursive relation) can lead to conjecturing, but the two cannot be equated. For Cañadas 
et al. (2007), the third stage of conjecturing (i.e., empirical induction from a finite number of discrete 
cases) is the search for and the predicting of a regularity in the pattern, which is clearly linked to 
identifying a pattern. Identifying a pattern, according to Stylianides (2008), goes further than observing 
a pattern. There is active searching, and then taking some distance from the phenomenon, which are 
necessary for MR. Furthermore, as for generalizing, there is no particular epistemic value associated 
with the inferred narrative. We thus define identifying a pattern as follows: 
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Identifying a pattern: A MR process that, by the search for similarities and differences, infers a 
narrative about a recursive relation between mathematical objects or relations.   
 
This process, from a commognitive viewpoint, differs from conjecturing and generalizing in that 
it is possible to identify a pattern that is applicable to a certain set without expanding it to a larger set. 
 
Comparing 
The term comparing is linked by various researchers to certain elements of MR, such as inductive 
reasoning (Simon, 1996) and deductive reasoning (Duval, 1995). Pedemonte (2002) links comparing to 
exemplifying and conjecturing. For her, MR must at some point involve comparing examples so as to 
be able to conjecture. The key element here is the inferential nature of comparing, which we define as 
follows: 
 
Comparing: A MR process that infers, by the search for similarities and differences, a narrative 
about mathematical objects or relations. 
 
Comparing can take place along with a plethora of other MR processes: generalizing, identifying 
a pattern, validating. For example, identifying a pattern necessitates comparing cases or examples so as 
to highlight the pattern. However, identifying a pattern goes beyond comparing because comparing 
only infers a narrative about similarities and differences. 
 
Classifying 
Classifying is associated by some with MR. For Mason (2001), “classification is not just about making 
distinctions and describing properties, but about justifying conjectures that all possible objects with 
those properties have been described or otherwise captured” (p. 7). Mason (2001) highlights a meta-
discursive rule upon which classifying is contingent: Mathematical properties and definitions are used 
to classify objects. The process of classifying is thus defined as follows:  
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Classifying: A MR process that infers, by the search for similarities and differences between 
mathematical objects, a narrative about a class of objects based on mathematical properties and 
definitions.  
 
Classifying is an important process that allows for object-level development by putting together 
or pulling apart different discursive objects, thereby structuring a discourse. Classifying can be 
associated with comparing, conjecturing, and generalizing. 
 
4.2.2 Processes related to validating 
 
For the second set of processes, the change in epistemic value is foregrounded. Drawing on Duval 
(1995), Lithner (2008), and Cañadas et al. (2007), the term validating is linked to the epistemic value 
that an utterance in a given narrative can take on (e.g., likely, true, probable, false) and depends on the 
mathematical discourse community where it emerged. Unlike Duval (1995), from a discursive stand 
there is no difference between epistemic value and truth-value. The epistemic value of an utterance 
depends not only on the logical validity of its structure but also on the shared discourse (meta-rules 
and accepted narratives) of a given community. This epistemic value, already highlighted by the 
structural aspect, is very important in mathematics for systematizing discourses and thus for 
theorizing. The three processes below, which are related to validating, are defined inclusively as 
follows:  
 
Validating: A MR process that aims at changing the epistemic value (i.e., the likelihood or the 
truth) of a mathematical narrative.  
 
Contrary to conjecturing that infers a narrative that is likely, the validating processes aim at 
changing a narrative’s epistemic value one way or another. This change can be from likely to true, 
from likely to false, or even from likely to more likely. The meta-discursive rules of mathematics 
constrain the possible changes of epistemic value. It is partly this definition of validating that will help 
us to highlight the different particularities of the three processes related to validation that emerged 
from the analysis of the corpus: justifying, proving, and formal proving. For the three definitions, the 
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word searching has been included to emphasize the process-nature of the activity. It involves 
searching for discursive information (data, warrant, backing), which allows for a change in epistemic 
value. 
 
Justifying 
Justifying is viewed by Yackel and Hanna (2003) as a social process, that is, more than one individual 
can be involved and the process is founded on public knowledge. Likewise, for Duval (1995), 
Stylianides (2008), and Cabassut (2005), this process is linked to a change in the epistemic value of a 
narrative by searching for data, warrant, or backing to support this change. However, in the literature, 
it is mainly the passage from likely to true that is addressed. Nevertheless, the process of justifying is 
associated with two types of epistemic passage. The first is related to the justification of a conjecture 
that arises from the process of conjecturing. This passage allows for changing the epistemic value from 
likely to more likely, as stressed by Cabassut (2005) in his discussions of plausible validation. The 
second type of epistemic passage is related to a validation that changes the epistemic value from likely 
to true or false, without being considered necessarily as constituting the process of proving. Thus, 
justifying is defined as follows: 
 
Justifying: A MR process that, by searching for data, warrant, and backing, allows for 
modifying the epistemic value of a narrative.  
 
The change of epistemic value is, as just mentioned, not necessarily from likely to true. The 
elements supporting the process are constrained by meta-discursive rules within a certain community. 
For example, the change from likely to true has to be based on a deductive structure. On the other 
hand, in changing from likely to more likely, some meta-rules constrain the process, but a deductive 
structure is not necessary.   
 
Proving 
The literature on proving can be divided into two groups: the texts that deal with proving and the texts 
that deal with what will be named formal proving6. The next section deals with formal proving. 																																																								
6	Formal proving is referred to in French as démontrer.	
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Proving is, as was the case for justifying, a social process. According to Balacheff (1988), for example, 
proving is a type of explanation that is socially acceptable. In addition, proving is linked to changing 
the epistemic value of a narrative: “Proving is the process employed by an individual (or a community) 
to remove doubts about the truth of an assertion” (Harel & Sowder, 2007, p. 807). However, the 
process of proving is associated more with deductive reasoning than is the process of justifying. For 
Maher (2009): “Proof making is a special type of mathematical activity in which children attempt to 
justify their claims by deductive argumentation” (p. 121). Thus, we define the process of proving as 
follows:  
 
Proving: A MR process that, by searching for data, warrant, and backing, modifies the epistemic 
value of a narrative from likely to true. This process is constrained by:  
i) the narratives that are accepted by the class community (the set of accepted narratives) that are 
true (from the viewpoint of the expert mathematician) and available without additional 
justification;  
ii) a final restructuring that is deductive in nature; 
iii) the realizations (in the sense of Sfard, 2008, p. 301) that are appropriate and known, or 
accessible, to the class. 
 
In mathematics, the deductive structure is associated with rigor. While the meta-discursive rules 
of mathematical discourse dictate that the validating process has to be restructured in a deductive way 
at some point, we emphasize that proving as a process does not have to be deductively structured at 
every moment. The notion of theorization underscored by Mariotti (2005) is that proving relies on a set 
of narratives that are accepted as true. Moreover, by accepting non-formalized realizations, the proving 
process can be developed from the primary school onward.  
Proving is differentiated from justifying by its potential for theorization. It is also more 
constrained than justifying in that it has to be restructured deductively and bear on a set of accepted 
narratives that are coherent with the mathematical discourse of the expert (e.g., the teacher), even if 
realized differently (informally).   
 
Formal Proving 
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For Hanna and Jahnke (1996), “formal proof arose as a response to a persistent concern for 
justification” (p. 889) among mathematicians. Formal proving7 is thus strongly associated with change 
of epistemic value.  For Balacheff (1988), formal proving is constrained by a strict structure and meta-
rules. Arsac (1996) highlights the social nature of those meta-rules with theory brought to the 
forefront. Formal proving can be differentiated from proving essentially by its rigor and formalism. 
While the process of proving is founded upon narratives that are mathematically true, the process of 
formal proving goes farther in that the narratives must be integrated explicitly into some mathematical 
theory. Formal proving is thus defined as follows:  
 
Formal proving: A MR process that, by searching for data, warrant, and backing, modifies the 
epistemic value of a narrative from likely to true. This process is constrained by:  
i) the narratives that are accepted by the class community (the set of accepted narratives) that are 
true (from the viewpoint of the expert mathematician) and systematized in a mathematical 
theory;. 
ii) a final deductive restructuring; 
iii) realizations that are formalized and accepted by the class and mathematical communities.  
 
As opposed to proving, formal proving relies on mathematical theory built a priori and on 
formalized realizations (axioms and theorems). As a consequence, the generic example as elaborated 
by Balacheff (1988), which is acceptable within the previously described process of proving, cannot be 
used within formal proving. 
 
4.2.3 Exemplifying: A support for the other mathematical reasoning processes 
 
Despite the fact that a smaller number of texts have dealt with exemplifying, the analysis of the corpus 
yielded some highly relevant treatments. Mason (1982) defines exemplifying as a process that allows 
for exploring a problem with the aim of conjecturing, or verifying the conjecture and refining it. For 
Pólya (1968), exemplifying can lead to generalizing. The generic type of exemplification (Balacheff, 
																																																								7	Formal	proving,	an	action	derivative	of	formal	proof	(a	term	widely	used	in	the	mathematics	education	research	literature),	should	not	be	construed	as	reasoning	that	operates	only	syntactically.		
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1988) can be associated with the validating process. Thus, linked to both the search for similarities and 
differences and validating, exemplifying can support each of the processes of MR cited previously: 
 
Exemplifying: A MR process that supports other MR processes by inferring examples that assist 
in: i) the search for similarities and differences; ii) the search for validation. 
 
Exemplifying allows for inferring data about a problem (which can be linked to the abductive 
structure). Those data can then be recycled in the search for similarities or differences in patterns and 
relations, but also within the processes of validating. Exemplifying thus generates elements that will 
serve in generalizing, in conjecturing, and even in validating.  
 
4.2.4 Concluding remarks on the process aspect of mathematical reasoning 
 
Even if they have been treated separately, all the processes of MR are interrelated. They stimulate and 
influence each other, allowing for the development of an increasingly more complex mathematical 
discourse by the generation of new narratives on already existing discursive objects. In particular, 
conjecturing and proving play an essential role in mathematical theorization. Indeed, conjecturing 
infers narratives that can potentially enrich mathematical theories and proving allows for systematizing 
the discourse, with the idea of theorizing it. Even if school mathematics is not formalized in the same 
way as the mathematics of mathematicians, systematization of discourse, even if somewhat local, can 
be engaged in within the processes of conjecturing and proving. We have also seen, for instance, how 
exemplifying is tightly tied both to the processes related to the search for similarities and differences 
and to the processes related to validating. 
 
5 A model of mathematical reasoning for school mathematics  
 
The outcome of this research project is a conceptual model of MR for school mathematics. Framed by 
commognitive theory and the methodology of anasynthesis, the model unifies a previously 
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unstructured domain according to two central aspects: the structural and the process aspects – two 
different ways of looking at a given discourse that are related dialectically. More specifically, the 
discursive framing of the research project provided a means of analyzing the various types of MR 
within the mathematics education literature and reformulating them according to their various 
discursive elements and the interrelationships among them. It is noted that while the model is general 
enough to be applied to various mathematical content areas, it remains a model of mathematical 
reasoning, as opposed to a model of reasoning per se, by the mere but important fact that it is rooted in 
a particular body of literature, that of mathematical reasoning, and is thus grounded within the 
discourse already built by members of the mathematics education community. By a similar argument, 
and also in line with the same commognitive stance, it is a model of MR for school mathematics – 
accounted for not only by the educational literature source from which the model arises but also by the 
manner in which its different elements (e.g., conjecturing and proving) have been characterized with 
the student of school mathematics in mind. In sum, rephrasing MR discourse according to 
commognitive theory can by its very nature help both researcher and teacher focus on what is visible 
and audible in the classroom. Furthermore, adopting a common discourse on MR carries with it the 
potential for members of the various mathematics education communities not only to better 
communicate with respect to MR but also to develop the learning resources needed for the 
improvement of MR in school. Nonetheless, because a narrative model is a living thing, this model of 
MR will surely evolve and grow in the hands of its users. Lastly, in the spirit of Balacheff (2008), the 
explicit formulation of the epistemological underpinnings of this model of MR can also be seen as a 
first step in eventually creating bridges between different epistemologies. 
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